

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 H-03

NSC-07 SS-20 DRC-01 AECE-00 /152 W

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P R 161730Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5740

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2710

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: NEW WG DRAFT REPORT ON OVERT GROUND INSPECTION

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

REF: (A) USNATO 2609; (B) USNATO 2070

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING MAY 15 WG MEETING ALLIES AGREED TO PRODUCE CONSIDERABLY SHORTENED AND FACTUAL PAPER ON OVERT INSPECTION. NEW DRAFT (TEXT BELOW) WILL BE TAKEN UP AT MAY 21 WG MEETING.

ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON REACTIONS. END SUMMARY

1. AT ITS MAY 15 MEETING, WG CONSIDERED BRIEFLY ITS PAPER ON OVERT GROUND INSPECTION (TEXT REF A). FRG REP SAID BONN COULD ACCEPT PAPER BUT ONLY AS A MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. HE THEN READ FROM INSTRUCTIONS, MAIN POINTS OF WHICH WERE:

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A. FINDINGS OF WG PAPER MUST BE SUBJECT TO POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, TO BE DISCUSSED IN SPC.

B. FRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY OVERT INSPECTION SOLUTIONS FOR

PHASE I WHICH EXCEED BONN'S PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD ON APRIL 1 AND 6 IN SPC (SEE USNATO 1832 AND 2477 RESPECTIVELY).

C. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE AT THIS TIME THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED.

D. STRUCTURE OF AN OVERT SYSTEM WILL DEPEND ON EQUIPMENT AND MOBILITY OF TEAMS, IN ADDITION TO AREA COVERED AND NUMBER INSTALLATIONS INSPECTED. FRG AGREES WITH U.S. VIEW THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF OVERT SYSTEM WILL NOT INCREASE IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF TEAMS EMPLOYED.

2. UK REP SAID BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES HAD REVIEWED NEW FRG STATISTICS ON INSTALLATIONS (WHICH APPEAR IN APPENDIX 1 OF ANNEX A IN REF A TEXT) AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT FIGURES APPEARING IN EARLIER DERFT (SEE REF B) WERE GENERALLY MORE REALISTIC, ALTHOUGH BASIS FOR AGREEING TO MATHEMATICS DEPENDS ON AGREEING WITH INTELLIGENCE AND DEFINITION OF INSTALLATIONS.

3. U.S. REP SAID HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. ON PERSONAL BASIS, HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO KNOW MORE ABOUT FRG AND UK FIGURES ON INSTALLATIONS. THIS WOULD DELAY ACTION ON A WG PAPER TO SPC.

4. SENSING THAT ALLIES COULD MAKE LITTLE FURTHER PROGRESS ON CURRENT DRAFT, AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT POLITICAL FACTORS CLEARLY DOMINATED ISSUE, CHAIRMAN PROPOSED THAT STAFF GROUP PREPARE CONSIDERABLY SHORTENED PAPER IN INTEREST OF PROVIDING EARLY RESPONSE TO SPC. NEW PAPER WOULD IDENTIFY VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE STRUCTURING OF AN OVERT SYSTEM, BUT WOULD DISPENSE WITH METHODOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS. NO CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PREFERRED SIZE WOULD BE GIVEN. WG QUICKLY ENDORSED NEW APPROACH.

5. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF NEW PAPER WHICH STAFF GROUP IS NOW CIRCULATING NATO-WIDE, AND WHICH WILL BE TAKEN UP AT MAY 21 WG MEETING. WE FIND NEW DRAFT MAJOR IMPROVEMENT OVER EARLIER
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PAPER. REQUEST WASHINGTON REACTIONS.

BEGIN TEXT

NEGOTIATED INSPECTION--GROUND SYSTEM

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, IN EXAMINING THE SCALE OR DENSITY OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM, HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ALL STUDIES PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED ON THIS SUBJECT, IN PARTICULAR:

A. A STUDY BY THE SUB-GROUP ON VERIFICATION(1).

B. A STUDY ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION BY THE US(2).

C. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP DOCUMENT ON THE STUDIES UNDER
A. AND B.(3).

D. THE WORKING PAPER ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION-GROUND SYSTEM(4).

2. ALTHOUGH CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN RECIPROCAL INSPECTION AND IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIABILITY, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE NOT BEEN INFLUENCED BY THESE FACTORS IN THE EXAMINATION. THE WORKING GROUP NOTED, HOWEVER, THE FRG STATEMENT THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE SPC ON THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF OVERT INSPECTION MUST HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON ANY FINAL DECISION AND THAT, AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, FURTHER STUDIES MAY BE NECESSARY.

3. FROM A MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW OVERT VERIFICATION, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY MOBILE TEAMS, ARE CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO OTHER NATIONAL MEANS OF CHECKING ON WP COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT. ENHANCED WARNING TIME IS EQUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE AN IMPORTANT BONUS. IN THIS CONTEXT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN THEIR DOCUMENT AC/276-D(72)4 IS PARTICULARLY VALID
QUOTE 13...IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S INTEREST TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF (MOBILE) TEAMS WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON A BASIS OF DIRECT
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RECIPROCITY BY THOSE NATIONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED
BY THE PRESENCE OF THE TEAMS. UNQUOTE

4. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE APPROACHED THE ASSESSMENT OF THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED FOR AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANY OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM, INCLUDING INSPECTION BY MOBILE TEAMS, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THE CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED THEN DEPENDS FIRSTLY ON THE JUDGMENT OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM AND SECONDLY ON WHAT ASSUMPTIONS AND PARAMETERS ARE ADOPTED AS A BASIS FOR CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS NEEDED. BOTH THESE ELEMENTS CONTAIN VARIABLES WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS.

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NSC-07 SS-20 AECE-00 /151 W

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P R 161730Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5741

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5. IN THIS CONTEXT THE WORKING GROUP HAVE
CONSIDERED TWO POSSIBLE INSPECTION OPTIONS BASED
ON MOBILE TEAMS:

A. THE US APPROACH (5). THIS PAPER ROUNDS UP THE
NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE POST-REDUCTION COVERAGE
TO 25 TEAMS. ASSUMPTIONS FOR CALCULATIONS ARE THREE-FOLD:
COMPLETE COVERAGE OF HARD SURFACE ROAD NET MONTHLY, OBSERVATION
OF REGIMENTAL SIZE INSTALLATIONS WEEKLY, INCIDENTAL SPOT
COVERAGE.

B. THE APPROACH IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP
WORKING PAPER(6), ANNEX A, APPENDIX 1: THIS MATHEMATICAL
APPROACH IS BASED ON A DISTRIBUTION OF INSTALLATIONS AND
BATTALION SIZE BARRACKS BY COUNTRY AND TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF
INSPECTION. ON THAT BASIS THIS PAPER CONCLUDES THAT IN
ROUND NUMBERS 100 MOBILE TEAMS ARE NEEDED, IF THE JUDGMENT
ON THE NUMBER AND KIND OF INSTALLATIONS AND FREQUENCY OF
INSPECTION USED IN THIS APPENDIX 1 TO THE ANNEX IS ACCEPTED.

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6. IN ESSENCE, THE WORKING GROUP ADVOCATES THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. OVERT VERIFICATION IS AN IMPORTANT MBFR ELEMENT.

B. TO VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND POST-
REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, NOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE THE
MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION.

C. A SYSTEM OF LIAISON BETWEEN INSPECTORS

AND THE HOST COUNTRY WOULD BE ESSENTIAL; THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW, WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP, AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR A HOST COUNTRY TO APPOINT LIAISON OFFICERS TO ACCOMPANY EVERY MOBILE INSPECTION TEAM. SOME BELIEVE IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ARRANGE THIS LIAISON AT SECTOR HQ LEVEL.

D. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM FOR INSPECTORS WOULD BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE WEST THAN FOR THE EAST.

E. THE PRECISE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED WOULD VARY WITH THE JUDGMENT ON THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHAT IS TO BE INSPECTED, HOW FREQUENTLY, AND IN WHAT DETAIL.

F. TO ACHIEVE A USEFUL SYSTEM OF INSPECTION BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS WITH A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY FOR DETECTING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT, A MINIMUM OF 25 MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE REQUIRED. ADDITIONAL TEAMS WOULD ENABLE THE INSPECTORATE TO EXTEND ITS ACTIVITIES, AND TO CARRY OUT MORE FREQUENT INSPECTIONS AND TO COVER MORE INSTALLATIONS AND A WIDER AREA, ALTHOUGH INCREASE OF TEAM NUMBERS AND INCREASE OF VERIFICATION RESULTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY PROPORTIONAL. DEPENDING ON THE JUDGEMENTS, WHICH DIFFER BETWEEN NATIONS, OF THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF INSTALLATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE INSPECTED, THE NUMBER OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS REQUIRED COULD BE AS HIGH AS 100. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF 66 TEAMS, BASED ON OTHER JUDGEMENT
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AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SEEMED A REASONABLE NUMBER OF TEAMS TO MANY NATIONS.

IF REGULAR INSPECTIONS WERE RESTRICTED TO QUOTE BORDERLINE SIZE UNQUOTE INSTALLATIONS, THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED WOULD BE 66 OR 100, DEPENDING ON THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON SUCH INSTALLATIONS. IF REGIMENTAL SIZE INSTALLATIONS WERE TAKEN AS THE BASIS, THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE LOWER THAN 66: UNTIL SUCH REGIMENTAL INSTALLATIONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED, NO PRECISE CALCULATION OF MOBILE TEAMS UNDER THAT ASSUMPTION COULD BE MADE.

G. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED COULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCED BY AT LEAST TWO PRIMARY FACTORS:

(1) THE RELIANCE WHICH CAN BE PLACED ON ACCURACY, TIMELINESS AND COMPREHENSIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

(2) THE EXTENT TO WHICH OTHER SOURCES
OF INFORMATION ARE AVAILABLE: IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS
RECOGNIZED THAT AERIAL INSPECTION, IF ADOPTED, AS AN
ADDITIONAL MEANS OF INSPECTION, COULD INFLUENCE THE
NUMBER OF GROUND TEAMS REQUIRED. IT COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE
FOR A GROUND VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED)
 - (2) US PAPER ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION", 5 OCT 73
 - (3) AC/276-D(74)1
 - (4) AGV(74)34/AC/276-(74)5(3RD REVISE)
 - (5) US PAPER OF 5 OCT 73
 - (6) AGV(7434; AC/276-WP(74)5(3RD REVISE)
- END TEXT

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02710
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740587/abbryuyr.tel
Line Count: 286
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) USNATO 2609; (B) USNATO 2070
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: NEW WG DRAFT REPORT ON OVERT GROUND INSPECTION
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

